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OVERVIEW
A LTHOUGH THE aviation community has recognized
the negative impact of wind shear on aircraft since the
days of piston aviation, it was not until 534 passengers
and crew members died in a string of serious aircraft acci-
dents beginning in 1970 that the degree of danger
presented by this phenomenon was correctly assessed.'
As a consequence, atmospheric scientists, meteorologists,
and the meteorological community as a whole, have,
through intensive study, greatly advanced both the under-
standing of the phenomenon and the technology for its
combat. Despite these advances, the scientific community
is still unable to effectively overcome the problem.
This Comment examines the development of wind
shear science and technology, and explores questions that
arise as a result. Scientific advances, as evidenced by tech-
nological devices from the simple anemometer to the so-
phisticated Doppler radar, are described in detail.2 The
crucial need for human involvement in the accumulation
I Trunov, Wind Shear Revisited, ICAO BULLETIN 26 (October 1986); see Corps,
Wind Shear: Corrective Measures Have Proven Successful, ICAO BULLETIN 11 (April
1988) summarizing the larger fatal accidents involving wind shear from 1970-
1985:
Date Airline Aircraft Airport Fatalities
7/20/70 Flying Tigers DC-8 Naha, AB, Okinawa 4
7/23/73 Ozark F-27 St. Louis Missouri 36
1/30/74 Pan Am B-707 Pago Pago Samoa 96
6/24/75 Eastern B-727 New York (JFK) 112
7/9/82 Pan Am B-727 New Orleans, Louisiana 153
8/2/85 Delta L-1011 Dallas, Texas 133
TOTAL 534
Id. at 12.
See infra notes 43-100 and accompanying text for a discussion of technological
advances.
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of knowledge needed to perfect technology is also ad-
dressed.3 Finally, issues are discussed relating to poten-
tial liabilities created by the shift of detection
responsibilities when new technology is implemented,
and, more importantly, the impact such a shift might have
on the future development of science in this field.4
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SCIENCE OF WIND SHEAR
Modern atmospheric scientists describe wind shear as
"a change in windspeed and/or direction in space, includ-
ing updrafts and downdrafts." 5 A microburst is a species
of wind shear occurring at a low altitude. The sophisti-
cated understanding of this phenomenon presently held
by the meteorological community is a result of many years
of intensive study and experimentation.
A. Early Development
Serious accidents resulting from the necessity of flying
military aircraft during bad weather in World War II en-
couraged organizations such as the National Advisory
Committee for Aeronautics and the Weather Bureau to
focus on a weather hazard that had yet to be thoroughly
3 See infra notes 101-137 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need for
human involvement in the development of the science of wind shear.
4 See infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact
of advanced technology.
5 Wind Shear, ICAO CIRCULAR 1 (1987). The Federal Aviation Administration
similarly describes wind shear as "a change in wind direction and/or speed in a
very short distance in the atmosphere." Air Safety: The State of the Art, Av. WEEK &
SPACE TECH., March 30, 1987, at 51 [hereinafter Air Safety]. For example, meteo-
rologists have observed 180 degree changes in wind direction as well as speed
changes of more than 50 kilometers per hour, within 200 feet of the ground. Id.
Wind shear can be caused by a number of forces, including:
the wind profile in the lower levels of the atmosphere, wind flow
around obstacles, wind flow associated with frontal surfaces, the
land/sea breeze effect, and the wind flow in and around convective
clouds and especially thunderstorms. Thunderstorms are by far the
most important source of low level wind shear-of the kind that has
proved to be lethal for aircraft in both the approach/landing or take-
off/climb-out phases of operation.
Fox, ICAO Circular Soon to be Published on Low Level Wind Shear, ICAO BULLETIN 12-
13 (April 1987).
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investigated: the thunderstorm.6  For the purpose of re-
searching this phenomenon, these organizations created
the Thunderstorm Project (the Project) shortly after
World War II ended in 1945. 7 Through research and ex-
tensive testing, scientists involved with the Project ac-
quired a basic understanding of the structure of simple
thunderstorms, and, more importantly, downdrafts.8
The Project's researchers determined that downdrafts
are initiated during the second stage of a thunderstorm
cell's life cycle.9 The initial stage of thunderstorm cell de-
velopment involves drafts of air swept upwards through
the cell.' 0 When the updraft reaches a height where the
air is much colder, vapor condenses, and water droplets
and ice crystals develop. Eventually, the weight of indi-
vidual water droplets and ice crystals become so heavy
that the updraft cannot support them and they begin to
fall, creating a downdraft. 1' As the moving air of the
downdraft reaches the earth's surface, it does not come to
rest but instead changes direction of motion "as would
any jet stream striking a plate."' 2 The vertical downdraft
6 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND WEATHER BUREAU, THE
THUNDERSTORM, REPORT OF THE THUNDERSTORM PROJECT (A joint project of four
U.S. Government Agencies: Air Force, Navy, National Advisory Committee for
aeronautics, and Weather Bureau) 3 (1949) [hereinafter THUNDERSTORM].
Id. "[The Project] made possible the release for peacetime use of equipment,
airplanes, and personnel to perform thunderstorm investigations on a much more
complete scale than up to this time had been considered possible." Id.
8 Interview with Alan Moller, Chief Forecaster with the National Weather Ser-
vice, in Fort Worth, Texas (October 8, 1989) [hereinafter Moller Interview].
"From studies [by the Project], it is now known that the thunderstorm consists of
a group of cells in which are concentrated the gustiness, drafts, hail, and other
weather elements that make flights through the storm hazardous." THUNDER-
STORM, supra note 6, at 133. The Project also learned that the life cycle of the
thunderstorm's cell is divided naturally into three stages:
1. Cumulus stage--characterized by updraft throughout the cell.
2. Mature stage-characterized by the presence of both updrafts and downdrafts
at least in the lower half of the cell.
3. Dissipating stage--characterized by weak downdrafts prevailing throughout the
cell. Id. at 19.
o THUNDERSTORM, supra note 6, at 19.
lo Id. at 20.
1 Id. at 21.
12 Id. at 24.
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becomes a horizontal surface current that flows outward
from the area of rainfall.'" Today, researchers know that
updrafts and downdrafts are integral elements of all types
of wind shear, including microbursts.' 4 The Project's ini-
tial study of downdrafts was a crucial first step toward
solving the current weather-related aircraft accident crisis.
B. Downbursts
The study of thunderstorms and wind shear intensified
in reaction to aircraft incidents in the 1960's and
1970's. 5 T. Theodore Fujita of The University of Chicago,
an "old fashioned, 'real' scientist,"' 6 studied natural thun-
derstorm phenomena in relation to aircraft incidents. In
the 1970's he determined that certain downdrafts are
"damaging" downdrafts, or, as he coined the term,
"downbursts." 7 A "downburst," as described by Fujita,
is a very strong downdraft which causes an outburst of
damaging winds on or near the ground. 18 This low-level
wind condition is similar to pointing a high-pressure air
hose at the ground; the vertically descending air fans out
in all directions.' 9 Fujita examined aircraft accidents and
downburst damage to crops, trees, and buildings, and
concluded that an intense downburst could generate tor-
nado-like damage.2 °
13 See infra Diagram A accompanying the text to note 36; THUNDERSTORM, supra
note 6, at 21-24.
' See supra text accompanying note 5.
15 Moller Interview, supra note 8. Concern particularly intensified after the me-
teorological event which caused the crash of Eastern Flight 66 at JFK airport in
New York on June 24, 1975. Wolfson, Characteristics of Microbursts Observed in the
Continental U.S., AMERICAN METEOROLOGICAL SOCIETY, 15th Conference on Severe
Local Storms 372 (February 22-26, 1988).
,6 Moller Interview, supra note 8 (specifically, Fujita is an atmospheric scientist).
17 Id. Downburst is characterized as "winds ... strong enough to blow down a
jet aircraft .... T. FujrrA, THE DOWNBURST 2 (1985).
,8 T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at 8. "The sizes of downbursts vary from less than
one kilometer to tens of kilometers." Id.
19 Air Safety, supra note 5, at 51.
2o T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at 1. Fujita examined fallen trees, thought to be the
victims of the super outbreak of 148 tornadoes in 1974, and noticed that instead
of the swirling patterns of fallen trees commonly seen from the air in the wake of
2671990]
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Fujita further subdivided downbursts into macrobursts
and microbursts according to their horizontal scale of
damaging winds. 2 1 A macroburst can be characterized as
a large downburst with outburst winds typically extending
beyond 2.5 miles. Lasting five to thirty minutes, these
winds reach velocities as high as 60 meters per second
(134 miles per hour) and often cause extensive, tornado-
like damage. 2 A microburst, on the other hand, is a small
downburst, generally lasting under ten minutes, with a
horizontal dimension of less than 2.5 miles.23 The
microburst's smaller scale and shorter duration are decep-
tively dangerous however, because an intense microburst
can contain damaging winds as high as 75 meters per sec-
ond (168 miles per hour).24
Fujita's "downburst" theory was initially rejected in the
meteorological community. Most meteorologists believed
that a downdraft, regardless of its initial strength inside
the cloud, weakened to an inconsequential speed long
before reaching the earth's surface.2 5 Convinced that un-
usually strong, small scale downdrafts not only existed
but posed a serious threat to aviation, Fujita obtained sci-
entific support for project NIMROD (Northern Illinois
Meteorological Research on Downbursts) near Chicago in
tornadoes, "hundreds of trees were blown down outward in a starburst pattern,"
indicating the occurrence of phenomena other than tornadoes. Id.
21 Id. at 8.
22 Id.
23 Id. "[A] microburst is a downburst having a horizontal dimension at the sur-
face no greater than four (4) km [2.5 miles]." U.S. Department of Commerce
(Fernando Caracena, Ronald L. Holle, Charles A. Doswell, III), MICROBURSTS: A
HANDBOOK FOR VISUAL IDENTIFICATION 20 (February 1989) [hereinafter VISUAL
IDENTIFICATION]; The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) describes the
microburst as "a part of the evaporation condensation process that produces cu-
mulonimbus clouds, heavy rain showers and thunderstorms.... [t]he wind shear
results from the convective movement of the air wherein low-level air heated by
the ground rises and is replaced by cold air descending from aloft." Air Safety,
supra note 5, at 51.
24 T. FUJITA, supra note 17, at 8.
23 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 372. The meteorological community generally ac-
cepted the theory that stage three of a thunderstorm cell's life cycle involved "dis-
sipation" or a general weakening of the downdraft. Id.
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1978,6 project JAWS (Joint Airport Weather Studies)
near Denver in 1982,7 and project MIST (Microbursts
and Severe Thunderstorms) near Huntsville, Texas in
1986.8 It was not until Pan American World Airways
Flight 759 crashed shortly after takeoff at New Orleans In-
ternational Airport in July 1982,29 that the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) took action and formed the
National Academy of Sciences Committee for the Study of
Low-Altitude Wind Shear and Its Hazard to Aviation.3"
The final report of this committee noted that scientists
"have recently begun to recognize the importance of
storm downdrafts that are unusually small in horizontal
cross sections and that are of short duration. Such down-
drafts have been called microbursts.' 1 t Finally, the mete-
orological community accepted Fujita's theory of
26 T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at 4. NIMROD was the first field program to study
the downburst. It was conducted in 1978 by the University of Chicago, with Fujita
and Srivastava as principal investigators. The purpose of the project was to define
the structure of downbursts in general. The NIMROD network operated for 42
days and depicted a large number of downbursts (using Doppler radars and 27
PAM (Portable Automated Mesonet) stations), including both macrobursts and
microbursts. Id. See supra notes 21-25, and infra notes 27-42 and accompanying
text. After NIMROD, the downburst was redefined "as 'an outburst of damaging
winds on or near the ground' where 'damaging winds' referred to winds of at least
18 [meters per second]; microbursts were simply wind events of this magnitude
on a smaller scale." Wolfson, supra note 15, at 372.
27 T. FUJiTA, supra note 17, at 4. JAWS was the second field program to study
the downburst. This three-month field program was conducted jointly by the Uni-
versity of Chicago and the National Center for Atmospheric Research and in-
cluded 100 scientists, engineers, and technicians. The principal investigators
were Fujita, McCarthy, and Wilson. JAWS was designed to depict microbursts,
rather than macrobursts, "because a number of microburst-related accidents and
incidents kept occurring in various parts of the world." Id. Through the JAWS
experience, the "microburst was redefined as having a 'differential Doppler veloc-
ity across the divergence center greater than or equal to 10 [meters per second]
and the initial distance between maximum approaching and receding centers less
than or equal to [2.5 miles].' " Wolfson, supra note 15, at 372. Denver was chosen
for the experiment because of "the area's 65 thunderstorms on average each year,
which ranks it among the highest in the nation." Wind Shear Microbursts Focus of
Weather Study, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, June 14, 1982, at 41, 43 [hereinaf-
ter Microbursts Focus].
28 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 372.
- Id. All 149 persons on board and eight persons on the ground died. Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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microbursts and their danger to aviation.
C. Microbursts
Fujita identified low-altitude wind shear found in a
microburst as an important factor in jet aircraft accidents/
incidents during takeoffs and landings. 3  In order to un-
derstand the potential for accidents in these circum-
stances, it is necessary to distinguish between a tornado
and a microburst. Put simply, a tornado rotates around a
vertical axis and a microburst rotates around a horizontal
axis.34 The microburst's horizontal rotation develops
when a thunderstorm's downdraft crashes to the ground
and deflects initially into an outburst flow which subse-
quently curls up from the ground to form a ring vortex
with a horizontal axis.3 As apparent from Diagram A,
this occurrence is typically radial. From an aerial view-
point, damage from a microburst results in a roughly cir-
cular "starburst pattern."36
Microbursts, occurring close to the earth's surface, are
most dangerous to aircraft during take-off and landing.
The airplane's intended flightpath is disturbed by the
microburst's rotation around its horizontal axis. Rapid,
32 Id. The "meteorological community finally seemed convinced of both the
hazard of low-altitude wind shear to aviation and the existence of microbursts
.... Id. After the acceptance of Fujita's theories, the focus turned to developing
a remedy, particularly after the crash of Delta 191 at Dallas/Ft. Worth in August
of 1985. Id. at 373. For a discussion on the use and development of conventional
and Doppler radars, see infa notes 49-79 and accompanying text.
11 T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at Preface. "The high concentration of accidents/
incidents in the United States does not necessarily mean that microbursts occur
frequently in this part of the world, but is the result of frequent landings and
takeoffs, as well as the method of accident investigation based on established.
knowledge of microburst wind shear." Id. at 22. This high concentration is ap-
parent upon examination of locations of microburst-related aircraft accidents/in-
cidents around the world (based on both confirmed and unconfirmed reports
available as of December 1984): U.S. Accidents/Incidents: Tucson, El Paso, Chihua-
hua, Denver, St. Louis, Chicago, New York City, Chattanooga, Atlanta, New Orle-
ans. International Accidents/Incidents: Naha, Bathurst, Pago Pago, Mexico City,
Kano, Nigeria, Bahrain, Doha, Bombay. Id. at 23, fig. 3.4.
.4 Id. at 14 and fig. 2.8.
- Id.
56 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 4. "Starburst pattern" is Fujita's
description of damage from a microburst. Id.
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TYPICAL MICROBURST WIND FIELD
(Diagram A)
severe changes in headwind and tailwind are typical dur-
ing the encounter, and often the aircraft is simply thrust
into the ground. 7 The schematic drawing below depicts
an aircraft encountering a microburst while on approach.
(Diagram B depicts cross section). As the airplane enters
the microburst, it first encounters the upswing of the vor-
tex circling a horizontal axis. This causes an increased
headwind which lifts the airplane above its intended flight
path (glideslope).s 8 Next, the airplane travels into the
central downflow, causing an increased tailwind which
37 Corps, supra note 1, at 11. "[The] so-called microburst ... is the most dan-
gerous.., when it is encountered relatively close to the runway by an aircraft that
is landing or taking off. The [microburst] . . . may literally thrust the aircraft to-
wards the ground, or at the very least cause major changes in headwind/tailwind
that severely upset the aircraft's flight path." Id.
38 This sudden lift often encourages the pilot to attempt to nose the aircraft
down, back to its intended flight path. This natural response is incorrect in light
of the downdraft the aircraft will encounter immediately theieafter. See infra note
91 and accompanying text.
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pushes the airplane below its intended glideslope 9






during takeoff lasts one to three minutes. The dangerous
winds are generally confined to within 100 feet above the
ground.40 Fujita concludes that this evidence of the rapid
evolution of a microburst is a "warning signal to a pilot
that an aircraft could encounter a strong wind shear a very
short time after a preceding aircraft, departing from the
same runway, reported no wind shear." 4'
39 T. FuJiTA, supra note 17, at 14; see also Wolfson, supra note 15, at 372.
4o T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at 24.
4 Id. at 25. As noted by Donald Engen of the Federal Aviation Administration:
If the pilot of Pan American 759 had waited 10 minutes to take off at
New Orleans, he wouldn't have gone down. . . . If Delta 191 had
gone around at Dallas/Ft. Worth, it would not have crashed. When
we talk about avoiding hazardous weather in the terminal area, we're
talking very brief delays-only minutes.
Lansford, Avoiding Hazardous Weather, AIRLINE PILOT, April 1987, at 19;
Good news is ancient news. If information from a pilot who took off or
landed just ahead of you is more than one minute old, it may be too
late to help you. When conditions are right, convective weather
hazards can develop with incredible speed ... the storm that Delta
191 flew into [was a] 'convective explosion.'
Id. at 23.
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II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WIND SHEAR TECHNOLOGY
A microburst can occur inside a major airport without
being noticed by those outside the airport. Indeed, a very
small microburst could affect one runway, causing grave
danger, without touching adjacent runways.4 2 Because of
its small size and short life, the microburst can easily es-
cape detection. As a consequence, a low flying aircraft
could encounter a microburst unexpectedly.43
Ground-based anemometers represent the first modem
effort to measure wind speed.44 An anemometer is a sim-
ple, mechanical device consisting of a wheel to which cups
are attached. Wind is measured by the corresponding ve-
locity of the spinning cups. While this method may seem
archaic, it is effective; the wind speed announced on the
evening news is generally measured in this manner.45
Since the anemometer only measures wind speed, rather
than wind direction, the ground-based anemometer is
clearly incapable of detecting a microburst.46
A. The Development of Conventional and Doppler Radar for
Meteorological Purposes
Shortly after World War II, meteorologists realized that
the strength and intensity of thunderstorms could be
measured by well calibrated radar. Weather radar has
since become a valuable tool in the investigation and pre-
diction of mesoscale4 7 phenomena.48 .
42 T. FujrrA, supra note 17, at 8 (as opposed to a macroburst which could affect
several states).
I4 d. at 8-9. Indeed, "[a] similar encounter could be experienced by cars and
trucks on highways or by boats and ships on rivers, bays, and oceans." Id. at 9.
44 Interview with James A. Horn, Specialist, Federal Aviation Administration, in
Euless, Texas (October 22, 1989) [hereinafter Horn Interview].
45 Id.
46 T. FujiTA, supra note 17, at 8.
4, Wieler, NEXRAD: A Doppler Weather Radar for Aviation Use, ICAO BULLETIN 28
(September 1986). "Mesoscale phenomena" refers to weather on the storm scale,
that is the space scale of 2 to 2,000 km and time scale of 0 to 24 hours. Examples
of these phenomena include: flashfloods, high winds, thunderstorms, tornadoes,
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1. Conventional Radar
Initially, weather radar came in the form of conven-
tional radar. This ground based radar, still widely used in
both the meteorological and aeronautical communities, is
usually located at remote radar sites. 49 At the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Control Center, National
Weather Service (NWS) personnel receive data from the
radar for conveyance to the airport. This procedure is
noteworthy because it begins to define responsibility and
possible liability.50
Technically, conventional radar measures thunder-
storms by transmitting short pulses of electromagnetic
energy as its antenna scans past a storm's activity. The
radar then "listens" to the energy scattered back by the
storm.5 ' This process is repeated many hundreds of times
each second and eventually a "map" (radar echo) of the
storm's precipitation is created. A conventional radar will
only measure the intensity of the returned echo. The im-
pact of this limitation is that tornadoes, turbulence,
microbursts, and other hazards cannot be detected by
conventional radar alone.52
A weather radar's usefulness is not limited to the identification of
severe weather. The aviation industry can use highly accurate radar
data to detect hazardous clear-air turbulence, to route flights using
the most favorable winds and to anticipate wind shifts for more effi-
cient routing of aircraft on approach and take-off.
Id.
.. Horn Interview, supra note 45 (remote in the sense that the radar are placed
off the airport and away from the FAA Control Center).
- For a discussion of potential liabilities, see Section IV "Impact of New Tech-
nology," infra notes 138-154 and accompanying text.
51 Ray, Brown, and Ziegler, Doppler Radar, WEATHERWISE, April 1979, at 68
[hereinafter Doppler] ("The time difference between when the pulse is transmitted
and returned tells the radar operator the distance to the echo.").
52 Id. "An exception is the rare case when the large circulation in which torna-
does are imbedded establishes spiral patterns in the rain, giving rise to the well-
known hook echo." Id. An additional problem with conventional radar is that it is
built with outdated equipment that is very expensive to maintain and, quite sim-
ply, is falling apart. Moller Interview, supra note 8. "[Doppler] radar is designed
to replace the aging weather radars now being used by the NWS [U.S. National
Weather Service], AWS [Air Weather Service] and FAA [Federal Aviation Admin-
istration]." Wieler, supra note 48, at 28.
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Nonradar weather detecting devices located on airport
grounds have also proved limited in their ability to ade-
quately detect microbursts. For example, at the time of
the Delta 191 accident, Dallas/Ft. Worth International
Airport (DFW) utilized a ground-based Low Level Wind
Shear Alert System (LLWAS). This system, comprised of
anemometers and other instruments measuring wind ve-
locity and direction, went into alert twelve minutes after
the Delta Airliner had crashed.53
2. Doppler Radar
To overcome the critical limitations seen in both the
conventional radar and ground-based detecting systems,
scientists developed the pulse Doppler microwave radar.54
Doppler radar operates exactly as conventional radar ex-
cept it is able to detect the speed of targets moving either
toward or away from the radar. The Doppler measures
5- NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD, AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT-
DELTA AIR LINES, INC., LOCKHEED L-1011-385-1, N726DA, DALLAS/FORT WORTH
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TEXAS, AUGUST 2, 1985 24 (1986) [hereinafter NTSB
DELTA 191 REPORT]. The National Transportation Safety Board investigation of
the Delta 191 accident revealed that:
The LLWAS has several limitations: winds above the sensors are not
detected; winds beyond the peripheral sensors are not detected; up-
drafts and downdrafts are not detected; and if a shear boundary hap-
pens to pass a particular peripheral sensor and the centerfield sensor
simultaneously, an alarm will not occur. In addition, the dimensions
of some meteorological phenomena-microbursts or macrobursts-
may be smaller than the spacing between the sensors and thus may
not be detected. However, since the downward flow in macrobursts
and microbursts turns horizontally as it approaches the ground, an
outward flowing shear boundary is established which eventually af-
fects one of the sensors and places the system in alert. The control-
lers in the DFW Airport tower cab stated that the LLWAS went into
alert either about the time the storm reached the north end of the
airport or about 10 to 12 minutes after the accident, and when they
checked the display, all sensors were in alarm.
Id. Additionally, the project director ofJAWS testified that the "LLWAS system
'does a good job with gust fronts. We found in an analysis of our work in Denver
in 1982 that it did not do a particularly good job with microbursts.' " Id. at 33.
- Id. at 56. "The only available equipment that can detect and track a
microburst throughout its entire cycle is the pulse Doppler microwave radar." Id.
The Doppler radar referred to in this Comment is the TDWR System to be uti-
lized in NEXRAD, discussed infra notes 68-79.
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the frequency change in the transmitted pulse caused by
the target's motion. 55 The conventional radar's wave-
length and frequency do not change as the beam reflects
off of the storms precipitation back to the station. Con-
versely, rain droplets moving away from a Doppler radar
station appear as longer wavelengths of low frequency
and droplets moving towards the radar station appear as
shorter wavelengths of high frequency. In other words,
"Doppler radar sees the direction of movement within the
storm, allowing rotation to be detected; conventional ra-
dar only reads storm intensity."' 56 The introduction of
Doppler radar into severe storm research added a new,
illuminating dimension.
55 Doppler, supra note 52, at 68. This is similar to the operation of a police radar.
Also, "[an analogous change in frequency is apparent as a train passes you with
its whistle blowing. These frequency changes are called Doppler shifts, from
whence the Doppler radar gets its name." Id.
,6 Id. See also Microbursts Focus, supra note 27, at 41. "[Conventional] weather
radar measures precipitation density while Doppler radar measures both precipi-
tation levels and wind velocity." Id. When, for example, detecting a tornado,
[a] Doppler radar takes advantage of the Doppler shift: the change
in pitch of a sound wave or of an electromagnetic wave generated or
reflected from a moving object. The portable Doppler radar, which
is battery operated, directs a microwave beam at the funnel of [the]
tornado. The signals are reflected off the swirling debris and rain in
the cloud and return to the radar unit. Electromagnetic waves re-
flected by material in the funnel that is moving away from the unit
are shifted down in frequency; objects that are approaching the unit
shift reflected energy up in frequency. By analyzing the shifts the
operator can ascertain the wind speed in the tornado and also the
direction in which the storm is moving.
Technology Eye On the Storm, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 22, 24 (1987). For the more
technically minded, the Doppler radar signature for a microburst involves a dipo-
lar shift pattern
similar to a mesocyclone signature, but oriented such that the axis
of the dipole is aligned roughly parallel to the beam instead of or-
thogonal to it. This orientation is due to the strong divergence in
the near-surface wind at the base of a microburst. Divergence
causes the strong gradient in the radial component of the wind that
is responsible for the dipole Doppler shift alignment with the beam.
VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 6.
5, See Doppler, supra note 52, at 68. Doppler radar technology as applied to
weather radars "has contributed to a better understanding of the causes and the
development cycles of weather phenomena, and has led to vast improvements in
our ability to detect, identify and predict severe weather." Wieler, supra note 48,
at 28.
COMMENTS
One obvious limitation to both types of radar is the fact
that echoes are only returned if rain droplets, hail, or
some other solid mass exists that can deflect the pulse.
This presents a problem in certain situations. For exam-
ple, dry microbursts 58 often occur at relatively long dis-
tances from the parent hail-storm and its associated heavy
radar echo. Thus, the radar detects only the parent
storm, seriously misleading the observer to believe that
areas around the storm are hazard free.59 The Doppler
radar is also more effective than conventional radar in this
context. The Doppler's resolution is superior because its
beam width is smaller than that of conventional radar.6°
This results in fifty-percent greater detail and, hence, a
better picture. Additionally, Doppler radar is capable of
detecting some particles that are smaller than water drop-
lets; consequently, dry microbursts containing debris,
dust, and even insects occasionally can be detected by
Doppler radar.6'
Doppler radar, however, is limited in a temporal con-
text. The radar's antenna operates in a three dimensional
vertical tilt sequence.62 One full sequence lasts from six
to eight minutes. A microburst can only be detected one
to four minutes before it occurs.63 While a one to four
s For characteristics of wet and dry microbursts, see infra note 119 and accom-
panying text.
59 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 22. In the case of a dry microburst
"pilots and others watching weather conditions on their radar scopes could have
easily misjudged the weather hazards in areas far from the storm's heavy radar
echo. By themselves radar echoes therefore may be very misleading ......
Radar is a vitally important tool for detecting hazardous weather,
but it shows us only what's happening in part of a thunderstorm-
the rainy downdraft region.... At low altitudes, you can have very
strong windshear lines 10 to 12 miles, maybe even as far as 15 miles,
from the storm echo itself on the radar. Pilots may think they're
avoiding the bad stuff by deviating around the strong radar echo....
but that can be an extremely dangerous area for trying to land or
take off ....
Lansford, supra note 42, at 22 (quoting Alan Moller).
- The Doppler's beam width is one degree rather than two degrees for the
conventional radar.
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minute lead time is adequate to keep an aircraft from
landing or taking off, the detection process, at a mini-
mum, takes two minutes too long-- Doppler's warning
may simply come too late.64
Another severe limitation on the Doppler radar's effec-
tiveness is that it is only capable of detecting movement
traveling either toward it or away from it.65 A microburst
usually has a radial "starburst" pattern.6 6 Thus a typical
microburst, with winds bursting in all directions, will cer-
tainly contain winds moving precipitation or debris either
toward or away from the radar's beam, allowing for detec-
tion. Often, however, the horizontal winds do not travel
in all directions. For example, it is quite possible that the
burst of precipitation and debris will travel only to the
east and west. If the Doppler's pulse is traveling from
north to south, perpendicular to the wind movement, de-
tection is not possible.
3. NEXRAD
Despite its shortcomings, the Doppler radar is a signifi-
cant advance in technology. Thus far, it has only been
used in a research environment at Stapleton Airport in
Denver. Fortunately, NEXRAD (the next generation
weather radar system), a joint project of the National
Oceanic Administration, Department of Defense, and the
FAA, will provide the meteorological community with au-
tomated Doppler radar for use in weather forecasting. 67
NEXRAD is a nationwide weather radar network designed
to serve a variety of needs. The Defense Department is
interested in Doppler radar for protecting air bases; the
National Oceanic Administration proposes to study many
areas of weather phenomenon;6 8 and the FAA is inter-
4 Id.
65 Id.
- For a discussion of microburst patterns, see supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
- Wieler, supra note 48, at 28.
" Moller Interview, supra note 5. "The system has been designed with expan-
[56
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ested in microburst detection to avoid weather-related
aircraft disasters.
Specifically, the FAA will use a variation of NEXRAD in
airport terminals. Referred to as the Terminal Doppler
Weather Radar System (TDWR System), this program will
have characteristics similar to NEXRAD, but with modifi-
cations that enhance its ability to function specifically for
the purpose of detecting and tracking severe weather con-
ditions occurring in and around airports. 69 In 1982, MIT
Lincoln Laboratory, under contract to the FAA, began de-
veloping the TDWR System. 70  The FAA moved the
TDWR System 7' to Denver for extensive testing to deter-
mine the feasibility of providing real-time low-altitude
wind shear information to air traffic controllers at Den-
ver's Stapleton airport in the summer of 1988.72 Exten-
sive experimentation revealed that by combining Doppler
radar with data processing and highly advanced displays,
the TDWR System will detect, measure, track, and report
variants in meteorological phenomena.73
sion capabilities in order that it serve the meteorological community for at least
the next 20 years." Wieler, supra note 48, at 28.
- Doppler Radar Selected for Wind-Shear Detection in the U.S., ICAO BULLETIN 30
(October 1988) [hereinafter Doppler Radar Selected]; Wieler, supra note 48, at 28-29.
70 Wolfson, supra note 15, at 373. The radar was first moved to Memphis, Ten-
nessee in mid-1984 to participate in the multi-year FLOWS (FAA-Lincoln Labora-
tory Operational Weather Studies) Project of 1985. When the FLOWS project
moved in 1986 to Huntsville, Alabama, the radar was moved again, and, during
testing,
[m]icrobursts were indeed found and datasets with scanning strate-
gies suitable for use in an automatic microburst detection system
were collected. Most microbursts in Memphis and Huntsville were
caused by the collapsing phase downdrafts of isolated, air-mass
thunderstorms, and were accompanied by very heavy rain. These
storms appear to be very similar to those that have caused a large
number of aircraft accidents ....
Id.
' Id. at 373 (at that time called "FL-2").
Id. "Denver was chosen for the experiment because of the area's 65 thunder-
storms on average each year, which ranks it among the highest in the nation."
Microbursts Focus, supra note 27, at 43.
7- Doppler Radar Selected, supra note 70, at 30. Specifically, "[r]aw radar data will
be routed through signal processing necessary to generate base data (reflectivity,
velocity and spectrum width), which will then be sent to the product generation
processor. Terminal area products will be produced using existing NEXRAD al-
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As planned, NEXRAD will automatically detect meteor-
ologically significant events and display appropriate alert
information to meteorologists, forecasters, and opera-
tions personnel. 4 The TDWR System, by virtue of its
storm tracking and prediction capabilities, will provide in-
formation regarding the past, present, and predicted fu-
ture position of each storm. Additionally, for ease of
interpretation, a typical NEXRAD display will superim-
pose such products as hail, mesocyclone and tornado vor-
tex signatures in graphic format against a map
background.75
The TDWR System's automatic meteorological al-
gorithm processing will aid in the interpretation of
weather phenomena and enable forecasts and warnings to
be issued earlier than currently possible, reducing the
number of aborted take-offs, landings and go-arounds.7
gorithms and new algorithms to detect wind-shear and microbursts." Wieler,
supra note 48, at 29. High quality weather information is anticipated from
NEXRAD because of its specialized radar features and Doppler processing
techniques:
[1] A high average power, fully coherent klystron transmitter per-
mits high signal-to-noise performance and provides high accuracy
data and detection of clear air turbulence.
[2] A ground-clutter suppression capability of 50 dB for Doppler
and 30 dB for reflectivity permits accurate observation and measure-
ment of precipitation at the lowest antenna elevation angles.
[3] Automatic unfolding of velocity information yields accurate auto-
mated weather data processing. Velocity unfolding can be fully au-
tomated at the S-band, because the high Nyquist velocity
characteristic of this frequency minimizes folding of the data field.
[4] Selection of optimum pulse reception frequency reduces obscu-
ration of weather data by returns from more distant storms.
[5] Data quality control eliminates aircraft and other point target
returns.
Id. at 29-30.
74 Id. at 30. Each NEXRAD radar "will be linked to an interactive user display
terminal, and any user location can request and use the latest data from any
NEXRAD unit. On-site computers will process the weather data in real-time as
each NEXRAD unit collects data from multiple elevation angles every five or six
minutes." Id.
7- Id. The detailed background maps "provide the user with a geographic ref-
erence. Images can be presented in a time lapse sequence or reoriented over an
area of interest and magnified for close inspection. Up to eight images at a time
can be presented on two high resolution monitors." Id. at 31.
76 Id. at 30-31.
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This sophisticated processing will execute computer anal-
yses to examine weather conditions and trigger automatic
alerts, directing attention to potential hazards. These au-
tomatic alerts are updated at five-minute intervals and is-
sued and distributed within five seconds of detection of
severe weather." Under the proposed plan, 102 systems
will be installed, beginning in late 1991, providing nearly
total coverage of the contiguous United States.78
B. Airborne Radar, Pilot Training, and Aircraft Improvements
Avoidance is the safest procedure for dealing with wind
shear. Avoidance, however, is not always possible. A
strategy for survival is therefore needed once an aircraft
enters a microburst.
Upon encountering a microburst, the pilot must man-
age the energy available in the aircraft,7 9 and maximize
engine power, thus prolonging airborne time and hope-
fully riding out the relatively short-lived wind shear phe-
nomenon. 0 Achieving maximum engine power is critical
to combat the extreme wind shear encountered in
microburst conditions. Early detection of wind shear is an
obvious prerequisite to quickly achieving maximum en-
gine power. Achieving maximum power can be difficult
considering the limited amount of time the pilot has to
evaluate the situation and initiate recovery techniques. If
the wind shear is severe, five to fifteen seconds must
suffice. 8'
77 Id. at 31. "The automated alert capability reduces operator fatigue and per-
mits concentration on the important phenomena, warnings and forecasts." Id.
78 Doppler Radar Selected, supra note 70, at 30. The nationwide system will cost
more than $282 million. "Automated storm surveillance, with pinpoint accuracy,
will permit continuous tracking and prediction of severe storms and tornadoes.
With . . .NEXRAD units, the network will allow about 90 per cent of complete
coverage fo [sic] the contiguous states (the incomplete coverage lying exclusively
in the mountainous west of the U.S.). Wieler, supra note 48, at 30.
19 See infra note 98 and accompanying text explaining the importance of energy
management during an encounter with a microburst.
80 Corps, supra note 1, at 11.
" Murphy, Wind-shear Recovery: 'Keep the Thrust Up and the Nose Up', ICAO BUL-
LETIN 11(1987).
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1. Airborne Radar and Pilot Training
The early detection of microbursts by airborne radar is
sometimes hampered by the pilot's misuse of or lack of
confidence in the radar equipment itself, or, lack of
proper radar operation training.
Pilots who lose confidence in their radar may allow outside
sources to make decisions for them. They may let the con-
troller decide for them. Most of the aircraft that have
crashed in convective weather were operating in an air
traffic control (ATC) radar environment. The controller
can be a useful advisor, but the ATC radar won't tell the
controller much about the weather, and it's not the con-
troller's job to make decisions for the pilot about avoiding
hazardous weather. 82
Airborne radar are usually short beamed conventional
radar. While these radar are incapable of detecting wind
movement, they can determine storm intensity. This is
important because storm intensity is directly related to
storm height and "tall" storms are likely to contain wind
82 Lansford, supra note 42, at 23. Evidence concerning the use of airborne ra-
dar on Delta Flight 191 supports the notion that such radar are often ignored and
misused:
Between 1751 and 1800 [the accident occurred at 1805:52], the
[thunderstorm] cell had intensified .... and flight 191's nose was
pointed at the cell until 1759:37 .... During this period the flight
crew would have been free to use the [airborne] weather radar to
scan the cell and to manipulate the antenna tilt to acquire the best
possible radar picture. Since the storm cell had [increased in inten-
sity] by 1800, the cell would have reached contouring levels of inten-
sity for the radar sometime during this period. However, the CVR
[Cockpit Voice Recorder] contains no conversation referring either
to what was or was not displayed, difficulties involved with manipu-
lating the radar antenna tilt, or the inadequacies of the radar in this
area of flight. Since it is also possible that the flight crew did try to
use the radar but did not engage in any discussion over the results of
the attempt, the Safety Board is unable to determine if the radar had
been turned off, or whether the flight crew tried to use it during the
final moments of descent and as the flight approached the outer
marker. Furthermore, because of the conflicting evidence, the
Safety Board cannot determine the capability of the weather radar in
a low-altitude, close-range weather situation.
NTSB DELTA 191 REPORT, supra note 54, at 68.
1908O MET38shear.83 For example, a storm with a top higher than
30,000 feet has a hazard probability of thirty-three per-
cent, while a 37,000 foot height increases the probability
to fifty percent.8 4 What pilots must do, then, is determine
a storm's height by using their airborne radar.
Airborne radar utilize precise tilt management to mea-
sure cloud-top height.85 Oversimplified, at high altitudes,
the pilot must position the tilt so the radar looks down in
order to see the mid-levels of a storm. In the terminal
area, the radar must be aimed up to scan the same levels
of the storm. Obviously, if a pilot flying an aircraft at low
altitude has the tilt elevated only five degrees, he may well
scan beneath areas of heavy precipitation emitting inten-
sity information. With the tilt at ten degrees, however,
heavy precipitation is detected and thus the true hazard
potential of the storm is revealed.86 Once the tilt is cor-
rect, precipitation is reflected on the radar as "radar
shadow."187 These shadows appear because the radar
beam is incapable of completely penetrating intense rain-
fall, and the signal is thus "absorbed" by the rain, leaving
nothing to reflect back to the radar antenna.88 If correct
intensity detection is accomplished, the pilot will know
when a thunderstorm is at an intensity level likely to pro-
duce microbursts. Although airborne radar can alert pi-
lots to the presence of most convective storm hazards
except dry microbursts, on board radar used in conjunc-
tion with knowledge of atmospheric conditions and subtle
clues that differentiate the merely strong or large echoes
, Lansford, supra note 42, at 23.
8' Id. "[T]all storms must be avoided .... Id.
Id. at 23-24.
Id. at 23.
87 Id. at 24. "[I]dentifying the radar shadow is the most critical radar operating
technique, and the ultimate radar rule is never, never continue flying toward a radar
shadow." Id. For example, the absence of ground returns behind an area of
heavy rain indicates that the radar signal is being fully absorbed by extremely
intense precipitation. Id. In color radar (as opposed to monochrome radar), the
most severe weather appears red, less severe weather appears yellow, and mild
weather appears green. Id.
88 Id. "If the energy from your transmitter cannot penetrate a target, there is
no way you can fly through it." Id.
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from the truly hazardous ones provides the most compre-
hensive detection system. 8 9
The early detection of a microburst does not necessarily
mean successful wind shear avoidance or survival. A dan-
ger lies in the fact that pilots are traditionally trained to
respond to weather conditions in ways that are not only
inadequate in a microburst encounter, but tend to worsen
the situation.90 This pilot problem is twofold:
First when the aircraft encounters the increasing headwind
and updraught, there is a tendency for the pilot to reduce
engine thrust to maintain the desired flight path. When
the strong downdraught and tailwind are then encoun-
tered at reduced thrust, the aircraft becomes vulnerable.
There is a delay before the engines can respond to a de-
mand for high thrust.
The rapid decrease in airspeed to alarm-level low values
leads to the second part of the piloting problem. The pi-
lot has been trained to lower the nose of the aircraft to
regain lost airspeed. Unfortunately, in a severe wind shear
encounter the atmosphere is already causing the aircraft
to offer a dramatic loss of climb performance, or an exces-
sive descent rate. Nosing down at this time makes matters
worse.
Even if the pilot has been trained to recognize a
microburst encounter and knows enough to sacrifice air-
speed for ground clearance, care must be taken to ensure
that the aircraft does not stall. This 'tightrope walk' under
conditions of severe turbulence is a considerable chal-
lenge to the skill of the pilot and is the reason for the pro-
vision of guidance instrumentation to assist him in
establishing the correct pitch attitude. 9'
89 Id. "And it should never be used to make a decision to penetrate a convec-
tive weather system, but rather as a gauge of how far to circumnavigate it .... Id.
Such "atmospheric conditions and subtle clues" are discussed infra notes 115-137
and accompanying text, in connection with the visual identification of
microbursts.
- Rahr, Wind Shear: Solving the Problem for Today and Tomorrow, ICAO BULLETIN
14, 15 (1987).
91 Id. at 14-15. This lowering of the aircraft's nose to pick up airspeed when it
is falling off in a wind shear situation, could be fatal because "[y]ou have traded
too much potential energy for kinetic energy. You hit the tailwind generated by
[56
In response to this critical need for training, regulatory
agencies and airlines train air crews in an environment
designed to simulate clear air turbulence, jetwash, and
wake vortex turbulence. Currently, the FAA requires sim-
ulitor manufacturers to provide realistic wind shear simu-
lation capabilities before it will grant higher training-
phase approvals. 02
2. Aircraft Improvements
Another answer to wind shear detection is aircraft im-
provement. For instance, Airbus Industrie of France in-
sures that the rapid application of engine power necessary
for wind shear survival is achieved through its "Alpha
Floor" protection.9" Alpha Floor is an autopilot and
autothrust system that both detects and reacts automati-
cally to wind shear.94 The system utilizes "angle-of-at-
tack."'9 5  Specifically, the angle-of-attack meter sends a
signal to the autopilot when the angle-of-attack of the
wing, responding to severe weather, increases to a certain
level and direction typically encountered in a microburst.
Therefore, if the wing angle exceeds predetermined
thresholds, engine power necessary to execute a "go-
around" is automatically applied.96
An Airbus aircraft's other principal defense against
wind shear is the speed reference system (SRS). The SRS
assists pilots in achieving the best conversion of kinetic
energy to potential energy and vice versa.97 Essentially,
the downdraft and lose lift." Researchers Study Methods to Combat Effects of Wind
Shear, Av. WEEK & SPACE TECH., February 21, 1983, at 42 [hereinafter Researchers
Study].
92 Researchers Study, supra note 92, at 43. Specifically, pilot training is effected in
three phases. Phases II and III include simulator training. The reference to
"higher training-phase approval" includes these latter phases.
93 Corps, supra note 1, at 12. Thus, Alpha-Floor may potentially initiate correc-
tive action before the pilot even perceives that a problem exists. Id.
94 Id.
" Id.
- Id. "Whenever this angle exceeds preset thresholds, which take into account
aircraft configuration and maneuver rate, 'go-around' engine power is automati-
cally commanded-even if autothrust is not engaged at the time." Id.
97 Id. at 13. This conversion guidance is obtained "via the pitch-command bars
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the SRS energy conversion guidance enables the pilot to
timely apply the maximum power needed to pull through
the microburst. 98 An aircraft is very vulnerable when trav-
eling at approach speed; if the speed of the airplane is too
low when encountering the wind shear, recovery may be
impossible.9 9 By detecting abnormal sink rates too minute
for detection by human senses, the SRS keeps the plane at
the lowest safe speed.' 00 The advantage of this system is
that it guides the pilot through the microburst, rather
than simply warning the pilot that the problem exists.
III. THE HUMAN SUPPLEMENT: FORECASTING BASED ON
ENVIRONMENT AND VISUAL IDENTIFICATION OF
MICROBURSTS
"A gap exists between what is available to researchers
in the way of detection, and what is available to the public
in the way of protection from microbursts."'1' Even the
Doppler radar, the most sophisticated tool current tech-
nology has to offer, is incapable of ensuring microburst
detection. Technology still requires human
supplementation.
In the context of weather generally and microbursts
specifically, information gathered by instrumentation
alone is insufficient to assure detection. Natural forces are
nonlinear- they contain random elements not solvable
by equations. Unfortunately, computerized instrumenta-
tion such as the Doppler radar operate by interpreting lin-
ear data. 0 2 It is therefore necessary to introduce other
on their attitude director indicator (ADI) or through the autopilot pitch channel
to prevent the aircraft losing height until the lowest safe flying speed is achieved-
it is at this rate that the aircraft has to descend." Id.
- Horn Interview, supra note 45. Mr. Horn argues that if the pilot of Delta
Flight 191 had applied full power seconds earlier, the plane would have likely
pulled through the microburst. Id. 99a See supra note 92 and accompanying text
for a discussion of wind shear dynamics during the approach phase.
- See supra note 91 and accompanying text for a discussion of wind shear dy-
namics during the approach phase.
-o Horn Interview, supra note 45.
101 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at v.
102 Moller Interview, supra note 8.
[56
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elements into the effort to avoid weather-related aircraft
accidents.
One theory gaining attention proposes that the combi-
nation of technology, research, and training will, as con-
clusively as possible, accurately solve the problem. This
approach would utilize current technology, continue re-
search to further develop the science, and train people for
visual identification of microbursts 1 0 3 The last aspect ac-
tually complements the two former ones because visual
identification of microbursts will both supplement the in-
sufficiencies of current technology and aid in gathering
knowledge. 0 4 In this sense technology is merely an aid
which well trained humans can employ in the acquisition
of knowledge and the further development of the
science. 10 5
Visual identification operates on two levels: (1) fore-
casters identify the environments in which microbursts
are likely to occur, and (2) trained spotters visually iden-
tify microbursts. 10 6
10, Id. Moller is convinced that visual evidence of microbursts exists which pi-
lots, meteorologists, Federal Aviation personnel (in the control tower), and ama-
teur "spotters" in and around airports could be trained to identify. This human
supplement could fill the gap created by the insufficiency of current technology.
Id.
104 Id. Moller suggests an example which illustrates the usefulness of the
human element. In a given number of potential tornado conditions Doppler radar
will emit identical preliminary information. Only fifty percent of the time, how-
ever, will a tornado occur. Moller proposes that a human spotter could see ob-
scure differences undetected by the machine element and thereby (1) supplement
current inefficiencies in detection, and (2) further the science by acquiring knowl-
edge. Id. Visual identification
will help fill gaps in forecasting and remote sensing of microbursts
and furnish the National Weather Service with a means of obtaining
observational data on microbursts to complement from other
sources such as NEXRAD [next generation radar] and the TDWR
[Terminal Doppler Weather Radar] which should begin to be avail-
able in 1991.
VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 2.
1o Moller Interview, supra note 8.
1o- VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at vi.
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A. Forecasting Based on Environment
Although a great variety of environments can produce
microbursts, they generally occur in one of two extreme
environments: either extremely dry conditions in which
most of the water evaporates before reaching the ground
or extremely wet in which microbursts are embedded in
very heavy rain.' 0 7 Atmospheric scientists and forecasters
determine typical characteristics of each extreme by ana-
lyzing both the variances of air temperature at different
altitudes and the layering of saturated and dry air.
The dry extreme typically develops in the semi-arid re-
gions of the West. Rain showers virtually evaporate
before reaching the surface, but nevertheless produce a
type of wind shear known as dry microbursts. 08 Tech-
niques for forecasting dry microbursts are well developed
and utilized regularly for environmental forecasting. 0 9
The extremely wet environment contains a dry source
layer that ejects pockets of dry air into underlying rain-
filled air, producing the evaporative cooling that can re-
sult in a microburst."0 Certain areas, however, such as
107 Id. at 15-16. "Severe wind shear ... includes both wet microbursts associ-
ated with heavy rain from thunderstorms, like the one that got Delta 191 [D/FW
International Airport, 1985], and the dry microbursts that you encounter at Den-
ver and other western airports in the high plains and the intermountain region."
Lansford, supra note 42, at 19.
,08 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 9 (description below Figure 8).
In the extremely dry environment, where moist convection is just
barely possible, cumulus clouds with very high bases form in a more
protected environment that is nearly saturated at about 3 km
[10,000 feet] above the surface; below this high-based cloud layer
there is a deep, dry adiabatic layer; dew point depressions are higher
nearer the surface where they may approach 30 [degrees] C.
Id. at 15.
- See id. at 16. Forecasting techniques for the dry extreme microburst are
"based on linear predictive models and discriminate function analysis." Id.
Id. at 9.
The wet microburst environment is marked by a deep, nearly satu-
rated layer with a nearly moist pseudoadiabatic lapse rate that is
topped by an elevated dry layer. The equivalent potential tempera-
ture of the dry layer is cold enough and the layer is sufficiently high
above the surface that, when it is reduced to its wet bulb tempera-
ture by saturation and mixed (in equal parts) with the warm updraft,
there is still enough negatively buoyant potential energy to drive a
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Texas and other states eastward along the coast of the
Gulf of Mexico often present an intermediate environ-
ment that fit neither the wet nor dry conceptual models,
but have some characteristics of both."' Even under such
moderate conditions, meteorological researchers have
identified typical environmental characteristics which are
indicators of microburst potential." 12
Forecasters not only utilize formulas based on air tem-
perature and saturation, but also estimate maximum
downdraft speeds based on data obtained from "sound-
ings" emitted from conventional radar."' The most ef-
fective method, however, for estimating potential
downdraft strengths may be a relatively simple index de-
rived from both surface data and conventional sounding.
severe downdraft through the sinking of such a mixed parcel to the
surface.
Id. at 16. Although researchers understand the dry extreme better than the wet
extreme, and consequently have developed more definitive techniques for fore-
casting the dry, several techniques are utilized for computing the downdraft po-
tential in the wet extreme. Two proposed methods are:
1. [Using] the fixed layer between 700 and 500 mb to compute the
downdraft potential energy; 2. [Using] floating levels that center the
dry layer on the potentially coolest air.
Id. at 16-17.
I- Id.
112 Id. at 17. These common atmospheric vertical temperature and moisture
profile characteristics are:
(1) Large positive area [large area of thermal instability].
(2) Little or no capping inversion.
(3) A dry adiabatic lapse rate layer, at least 5000 ft deep, below the
cloud condensation level.
(4) A moist midtropospheric layer between 5000 and 15,000 ft.
(5) An elevated dry layer above 15,000 ft.
Id. These characteristics indicate that in an intermediate microburst environment
"subcloud evaporation is still quite capable of producing a microburst, but ...
absolute humidity is high enough to produce very heavy rain as well." Id. at 18.
IS Id. at 18-19. In 1985, Srivastava, a weather scientist, developed
a one-dimensional evaporatively driven downdraft model that uses
such parameters as raindrop size distributions, rain-water mixing ra-
tios, and sub-cloud lapse rates to predict the maximum velocity in a
downdraft. This model indicates that the downdraft maximizes
when rainwater with a high mixing ratio is dispersed as very small
drops and falls into a deep dry-adiabatic sub-cloud layer.
Id.; see also Srivasta, A Simple Model of Evaporatively Driven Downdraft: Application to
Microburst Downdraft, 42 J. ATMOSPHERIC SCIENCE 1004 (1985).
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At present, unfortunately, no such index exists." 4
B. Visual Identification of Microbursts
Skill in visual identification of microbursts is important
for pilots, controllers, and weather observers. Such iden-
tification may be the final line of defense in avoiding a
microburst-related aircraft accident or disaster.' 15  An
analysis and theoretical treatment of photographic docu-
mentation provides a strong basis for visually identifying
microbursts. " 16
1. Visual Identification by Spotters
Since visual classification of an event such as a
microburst, macroburst, or simply a gust front is often dif-
ficult, trained spotters could first estimate cloud height,
degree of cloud cover and visibility." 7 A spotter could
then determine whether a downburst is a microburst by
comparing its size with features of known scale, such as a
grid of roads one mile apart, a copse of trees, or a row of
lamp posts.""
Before classification can occur, however, the spotter
must first see the downburst. The dry microburst can be
deceptive because at first glance it may present a fair-
weather appearance. Often, the only clue to potential
microburst development may be the existence of fibrous-
looking clouds coupled with scattered virga shafts. 1 9 The
'14 VISUAL INDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 19.
,,- Id. "Accident investigators and aviation weather experts believe that [wind
shear related] accidents occur because pilots fail to perceive the hazardous condi-
tions that exist, and that the solution for that is more knowledge of how to recog-
nize such conditions." Lansford, sura note 42, at 19.
116 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 19.
117 Id. at 20. Difficulty in classification occurs because "a downburst may ini-
tially reach the surface as a microburst (or perhaps several microbursts) and sub-
sequently expand into a larger scale downburst (macroburst)." Id. It is further
possible that "the parent storm could continue to develop into a supercell storm
[a storm that is always severe and often produces the most extreme severe
weather events] or squall line [a narrow line of storms], resulting in the
downburst's developing continuously into a large-scale gust front." Id.
- Id. at 20-21.
1' Id. at 18. As the microburst develops, the ring of dust spreads out over the
[56
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microburst itself may be rendered visible by an expanding
ring of dust on the earth's surface forming immediately
below a prominent shaft-like protrusion (virga) of cloud
extending from the high base of the cumulonimbus.120
The wet extreme offers better visual evidence than its
dry counterpart. Both high-based and low-based thun-
derstorms provide visual clues for microburst detection.
A high-based thunderstorm121 producing heavy rain at the
surface may produce a foot-shaped bulge between the
cloud base and the earth's surface extending outward
from the center of the rain downpour. This bulge, a char-
acteristic mark of a microburst, is made up of strong hori-
zontal winds carrying precipitation outward from the
impact center of the downdraft. 22
Similar to high-based thunderstorms, low-based clouds
also produce heavy rain with this same foot-shaped evi-
dence of an embedded microburst. In this situation, a
mass of heavy rain reaching the surface with a relative
clearing immediately above the cloud mass suggests a
strong downdraft and a possible microburst.12 3
earth's surface. At very close range "blowing dust might be seen, but only a por-
tion of the ring might be visible." Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 14.
A high-based thunderstorm is a thunderstorm in which the cloud base-line is
very high.
' VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 22.
High-based thunderstorms with heavy rain should be of particular
concern in air safety since they signal a deep mixed layer ... and
plenty of precipitation to fuel a strong downdraft .... For example,
at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport a thunderstorm based
about 3 km [1.9 miles] above the surface produced intense wind
shear that caused Delta Flight 191 to crash ....
Id. at 25.
123 Id. at 24 (language below Figure 22b). "A descending wet microburst may
first appear as a darkened mass of rain descending through light rain .. . [or] a
clearing out of precipitation in its wake ... [which] is one visual indicator of a
potential microburst." Id. at 26. This phenomenon results when a
strong downdraft conveys rain toward the surface at a much faster
rate than it can fall at terminal velocity through still air. As the
downdraft approaches the ground it decelerates in the vertical, al-
lowing a heavy load of water to accumulate above the ground. This
results in an opaque low-flying base to the rain shaft.
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Plainly, the telltale visible signs of an embedded
microburst are either a curved swirl of dust in dry areas or
a spray of raindrops in wet areas. 124 In either case, the
light dust or rain spray delineates the swirling outflow
that could strengthen into a microburst.12 5 These upward
curls indicate embedded microbursts with vortex circula-
tions that carry the dust or rain spray back up toward the
cloud. 126
Field experiments such as JAWS supplied general rules
useful for visual detection. 2 7 For example, microbursts
are normally a mid-afternoon, mid-summer phenomena.
Again, dry microbursts generally occur in arid or semi-
arid portions of the country and wet microbursts in humid
areas.' 28  Exceptions, however, exist: dry microbursts
have been observed in such humid areas as Wichita, Kan-
sas, and near Chicago, while wet microbursts have oc-
curred in arid Tucson, Arizona. 29 In any part of the
country there is some mix of wet and dry microbursts oc-
curring outside the normal statistical time and season.
Observers, therefore, should remain alert to out-of-sea-
son microbursts because "[w]herever and whenever it oc-
curs, and regardless of its type, a microburst can cause an
airplane crash, and should be taken seriously."'' 30
2. Visual Idenification by Pilots
Many forecasters and atmospheric scientists emphasize
that with improved training the pilot can judge the poten-
tial hazard of a storm by analyzing its structure and
strength. With knowledge of the storm type, and its po-
tential for interaction with its environment, pilots can esti-
'24 Id. at 26-28.
125 Id. at 28.
126 Id.
17 See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
128 VISUAL IDENTIFICATION, supra note 23, at 29.




mate its hazard potential, at least qualitatively.'13  One
serious problem is that many pilots tend to neglect visual
clues and other sources of data valuable for evaluating
weather hazards.132
Cloud shapes hold visible clues a pilot can use to deter-
mine whether a takeoff or landing may take the aircraft
through wind shear or other weather dangers.'33 A basic
understanding of the types of convective storms and their
potential for wind shear can help pilots do a much better
job of avoiding hazardous weather. Meteorologists class-
ify thunderstorms into four categories:
(1) Single-cell storms, which can be non-severe or severe.
(2) Multicell storms, which can be non-severe or severe.
(3) Supercell storms, which are always severe. (4) Squall
lines, which can be non-severe or severe. 134
Additionally, pilots and researchers, with support from
the FAA, have developed probability guidelines for visual
detection of wind shear by pilots. 3-' These guidelines
include:
1-, Lansford, supra note 42, at 20-21 (quoting Alan Moller).
1-2 Id. at 20.
" Id. Archie Trammell, radar expert, maintains that
many pilots assume that air traffic control (ATC) radar does a better
job of depicting hazardous weather than does their airborne radar
system. That assumption is totally false, ATC radar is designed to
paint aircraft, ,.not weather; to depict aircraft in spite of heavy
weather. Controllers use it to maintain separation between aircraft.
It is not their responsibility to maintain separation between aircraft
agd weather.
Id.
1 Id. at 21-22. Single-cell storms generally grow almost vertically, causing the
downdraft and updraft to cancel each other out, usually eliminating the possibility
of severe weather. Occasionally, however, the single-cell storm can bring about a
short episode of severe weather and potentially, a microburst.
Because the severe single-cell storm is so small and develops so
rapidly, it often appears without any severe-weather warning from
forecasters or controllers. Thus it calls for special vigilance from pi-
lots-this kind of storm brought down Delta 191 at Dallas/Fort
Worth and Pan Am 759 at New Orleans.
Id.
135 Id. at 25.
294 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
Presence of convective weather near intended flight-
path:
[1] With localized strong winds (tower reports or observed
blowing dust, rings of dust, tornado-like features, etc.).
Probability of wind shear: High
[2] With heavy precipitation (observed or radar indica-
tions of contour, red, or attenuation shadow).
Probability of wind shear: High
[3] With rainshower.
Probability of wind shear: Medium
[4] With lightning.
Probability of wind shear: Medium
[5] With virga.
Probability of wind shear: Medium
[6] With moderate or great turbulence (reported or radar
indications).
Probability of wind shear: Medium
[7] With temperature/dew-point spread between 30 and
50 degrees Fahrenheit.
Probability of wind shear: Medium" 6
These visual identification techniques and environmen-
tal forecasting capabilities both aid in the avoidance of
microburst related accidents and supplement the inade-
quate linear-based interpretation of data provided by cur-
rent detection devices. More importantly, the human
element fosters the development of a more dependable
technology. For now, however, the only measure more
important than visual and radar identification, more criti-
cal than survival techniques is avoidance.
[A]voidance is the most critical factor. It's important for
pilots to know how to respond if they find themselves in a
microburst, but they should never get into one if they can
possibly avoid it. Pilots should remember that some
microbursts are so severe that they cannot be flown with
any known recovery technique. 17
,so Id.
137 Id. at 24-25. In connection with this need for avoidance and the ability to
visually detect a microburst, the findings of the National Transportation Safety
Board in connection with the Delta 191 Crash are as follows:
[56
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IV. IMPACT OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY
Advanced technology may have an impact on aspects of
aviation other than decisions made in the cockpit. There
is a growing concern over possible increased liability for
controllers and weather personnel due to new technologi-
cal requirements and procedures related to the use of
Doppler radar.
A. Potential Liability and Its Impact
Controller/weather personnel liability generally stems
from either a failure to timely transmit information or in-
correct data interpretation.138
As seen in the Delta 191 trial, both national
weathermen and FAA personnel located off the airport
terminal have a legal duty to advise incoming aircraft of
extreme and hazardous weather in and around the air-
port. 139 Judge Belew found that although this duty ex-
isted, the causal connection is terminated if the aircraft's
crew already has such information.140 The trial transcripts
demonstrate that a great deal of time was spent discussing
the impact of the national weatherman's absence from his
station due to a dinner break, when the microburst
formed. 4 1 Delta alleged that as a result of his absence,
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the
probable causes of the accident were the flightcrew's decision to ini-
tiate and continue the approach into a cumulonimbus cloud which
they observed to contain visible lightning; the lack of specific guide-
lines, procedures, and training for avoiding and escaping from low-
altitude wind shear; and the lack of definitive, real-time wind shear
hazard information. This resulted in the aircraft's encounter at low
altitude with a microburst-induced, severe wind shear from a rapidly
developing thunderstorm located on the final approach course.
NTSB DELTA 191 REPORT, supra note 54, at 80 (emphasis added)
138 Horn Interview, supra note 45.
139 Delta Flight 191 Court Ruling of Crew Error in 1985 Dallas Crash Examines Se-
quence of Flight into Thunderstorm, 3 AIR SAFETY WEEK 1 (1989).
140 Id. at 2.
14, NTSB DELTA 191 REPORT, supra note 54, at 78.
The absence of the CWSU meteorologist from his station between
1725 and 1810 [accident occurred at 1805:52], and the failure of
CWSU procedures to require the position to be monitored by a
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the NWS and FAA failed to relay crucial weather informa-
tion to the pilot in a timely manner. This turned out to
be, in the eyes of the court, a harmless error since evi-
dence illustrated that the aircraft's crew already had the
information. 142 The court reaffirmed that weather per-
sonnel and controllers have a legal duty to relay informa-
tion in a timely manner. New technology does not impact
this duty.
One area where advancing technology may alter the du-
ties of ground personnel is in the TDWR System. A cru-
cial difference between current operations and the
proposed NEXRAD program is that TDWR output will be
relayed primarily to terminal radar approach control facil-
ities ("TRACON") and tower controllers. 43 Under the
current system, NWS personnel and the conventional ra-
dar from which they obtain data are located off the airport
premises. When the weatherman receives information
from the radar, he sends it to tower personnel (located on
the airport), who then convey it to approaching/departing
pilots.' 44 Under the TDWR System, the Doppler radar
will be located on the airport premises and will display the
information directly to tower controllers. The controllers
will then convey the information to approaching/depart-
ing pilots. This will create a shift in responsibility. A fun-
damental question arises out of this shift in responsibility:
will it impact the legal status of the NWS and FAA when
weather related accidents occur? If the answer to the
question is yes, the shift in liability may, in turn, indirectly
hamper further efforts to develop superior technology
and continue to expand the science.
qualified person during his absence precluded detection of the in-
tensification of the weather echo north of the DFW Airport.Id.
,42 Id. at 3. The cockpit voice recorder revealed the following conversation: "At
1804:18 [the accident occurred at 1805:52], the first officer said, 'Lightning com-
ing out of that one [cloud].' The captain asked, 'What,' and the first officer re-
peated 'Lightning coming out of that one." The captain asked, 'Where' and at
1804:23, the first officer replied, 'Right ahead of us.' " Id.
,43 Doppler Radar Selected, supra note 70, at 30.
'44 Horn Interview, supra note 45.
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Liability may indirectly hamper technological growth
because, as seen recently in the medical field, the possibil-
ity of liability discourages people from entering the af-
fected field. Employees of both the NWS and FAA are
simply afraid to interpret data because of the responsibil-
ity and consequential liability attached to this task. The
fact that the FAA and NWS are often vicariously liable for
their employee's conduct carries little weight in this con-
text given the fact that employees causing the liability are
frequently dismissed. Therefore, the employees are per-
sonally affected by such liability, and may consider this
possibility when making a career choice. The data inter-
pretation aspect of the Doppler Radar System is critical
for future technological growth. If people are afraid to
engage in data interpretation because of possible liability,
technological growth is impeded and improvements to
flight security are delayed.
Possible solutions to this growth impediment are dis-
cussed below. These options are merely the author's
opinion presented very broadly and intended simply to
provoke consideration. A detailed analysis of each is
outside the scope of this comment.
B. Possible Responses to Growth Hampering Liability
1. The Black Box System
Depending upon the manner of implementation, the
TDWR System may impact weatherman/controller liabil-
ity in the context of data interpretation. 4 5 Controllers
and meteorologists are, as a general rule, reluctant to in-
terpret Doppler radar data. They would prefer that the
Doppler radar be completely automated-a sort of "black
box" device that will "sound an alarm" if a microburst is
detected-rather than requiring data interpretation, and
hence, possible fallacy by the controller or meteorolo-
gist.146 A "black box" device eliminates potential liability
145 Moller Interview, supra note 8.
140 Id.
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for inaccurate data interpretation. The duty to timely
convey such information, of course, would still exist.
The "black box" method, however, will hinder scientific
and technological growth. Similar to the visual identifica-
tion process discussed above, 47 human involvement and
interpretation in the Doppler radar context also allows for
detection of obscure irregularities that cannot be trans-
lated into linear equations. 48  If the alarm sounds only
when predetermined, programmed events occur, the op-
portunity for learning is eliminated and growth is
hampered.
Requiring data interpretation, however, necessarily im-
poses extended responsibility on controllers which carries
with it potential liability. The after-the-accident campaign
to pin a "duty" on weather personnel, controllers, and pi-
lots, removes society's focus from where it arguably
should be-on solving the problem of wind shear. Soci-
ety hurts itself by creating a litigious atmosphere where
no one will take the steps necessary for scientific progres-
sion because the risk of liability is too high.
2. The Tort System
Presently, disputes involving aircraft accidents are re-
solved through conventional case-by-case adjudication of
liability. Generally accepted rules concerning the liability
of air traffic controllers and pilots have emerged which
dictate that both the pilot and controller owe a duty of
care to aircraft passengers.' 49 Additionally, case law gen-
14 See supra notes 115-37 and accompanying text for discussion relating to vis-
ual identification of microbursts.
148 Moller Interview, supra note 8.
14 Redhead v. United States, 686 F.2d 178, 182 (3rd Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1203. As noted by the court, "[bloth the pilot and the air traffic controller
owe a duty of care to passengers in an airplane. Negligence by the pilot does not,
in and of itself, absolve the government of liability. Each is responsible for the
safe conduct of aircraft and the safety of its passengers .... Thus, there may be
concurrent liability." Id. (citations omitted). In a later case, Rodriquez v. United
States, 823 F.2d 735 (3rd Cir. 1987), the court referred to its earlier opinion in
Redhead, stating:
Although we recognized that the pilot bears 'final authority' for air-
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erally holds that the day-to-day decisions made by FAA air
traffic controllers as they control aircraft typically fall
outside the Federal Torts Claim Act's (FTCA) "discre-
tionary function" exception to liability.15 0
A possible response to growth-hampering liability lies
in either the modification of the FTCA or a decision by
the judiciary to foreclose liability in defined
circumstances.
First, the FTCA could be amended to remove liability
from FAA air traffic controllers and National Weather
Service (NWS) personnel. Specifically, a narrow excep-
tion to liability could be created in circumstances where
craft operation and is to be held to 'the highest degrees of care,' we
also held that air traffic controllers could be held liable if 'negligence
on the part of such persons [has] a causal relationship to the hap-
pening of the accident.'
Rodrguez, 823 F.2d at 746.
-5 Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671-2680 (1988) [hereinafter FTCA].
Section 2674 states the general provisions of the FTCA:
The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this
title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same ex-
tent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be
liable for interest prior to judgment or for punitive damages.
If, however, in any case wherein death was caused, the laws of the
place where the act or omission complained of occurred provides, or
has been construed to provide, for damages only punitive in nature,
the United States shall be liable for actual or compensatory dam-
ages, measured by the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death
to the persons respectively, for whose benefit the action was
brought, in lieu thereof.
Id. The relevant exception to the general provision set forth above is found in
Section 2680:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or
based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or
perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the dis-
cretion involved be abused.
Id. Judicial interpretation of the FTCA consistently places day-to-day decisions
made by air traffic controllers as "operational" decisions, rather than "discretion-
ary," and thus beyond the scope of the exception. In Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 931, the court held that
negligent directions given by an air traffic controller to an airplane pilot was not
immune from attack under the FTCA discretionary function exception. 373 F.2d
at 238.
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wind shear is a significant causal factor in a weather-re-
lated aircraft accident and incorrect or inadequate data in-
terpretation by controllers or weather personnel
occurred. Alternatively, specific types of data interpreta-
tion (for example, interpreting data from a Doppler radar)
could be designated a per se "discretionary function."
While this modification may appear to unfairly favor
NWS and FAA employees over pilots, if the goal is to nul-
lify specific sources of liability that impede scientific and
technological, growth it is a necessary step. Liability for
incorrect interpretation of data from a Doppler radar is
precisely the type of liability that hampers growth. The
fact that controllers and NWS personnel are given such
duties and thus, are the individuals protected, is fortui-
tous. On the other hand, pilots and commercial airlines
are a necessary part of our society. The removal of liabil-
ity from the government likely shifts liability to pilots and
commercial airlines; a result that is both unfair and detri-
mental to their continued existence. This problem can be
resolved under the following alternative.
Second, the judiciary could simply foreclose liability in
certain defined circumstances by determining that no duty
is owed and thus no negligence exists. That is, the judici-
ary can determine that a controller has no duty to accu-
rately interpret data from a Doppler radar. Additionally,
case law can dictate that the conduct of pilots and com-
mercial airlines does not reach the level of tortious negli-
gence (under the theory that no duty exists, no breach
occurred, or no causal relationship exists) when a very
specific, narrow set of circumstances exist.' 5'
While these proposals may seem drastic and even dan-
gerous, the obvious fact is that no pilot wants to risk his
life, nor his passenger's lives in a weather-related acci-
dent. Neither do air traffic controllers nor weather per-
sonnel wish to be responsible for the death of others due
1." The requirement of specific, narrow circumstances should be strictly con-




to their error. The threat of legal liability provides little
in the way of additional deterrence. 52 The possibility of
personal injury or responsibility for injury of another has
sufficient deterrent effect. Individuals unaffected by this
possibility surely would not be deterred, in any event, by
the added threat of legal liability.
3. No Fault Compensation System
Another option for resolving the hampering effect of li-
ability in wind shear related aircraft accidents is the imple-
mentation of a no fault compensation system. The
presence of wind shear as a significant causal factor in the
accident would trigger the no fault system, allocating a
predefined amount of compensation to injured individu-
als. Payment of compensation could be borne by both the
government and the commercial airline involved. Thus,
compensation for the injured would ultimately come from
the public through higher prices paid for airline services
and higher taxes paid to the government. The cost
spreading effect of the system puts the burden on the
public-the beneficiary of the services. 5M The certainty
created by this option would obviate the detrimental ef-
fects of liability and permit technological growth.
4. Mandatory Arbitration Method
The damaging effects of increased litigation will eventu-
ally create a critical void in the aeronautics field. As seen
recently in the medical field, increased liability discour-
15'2 The focus here is on the pilot, air traffic controller, and NWS employee.
Obviously, the threat of legal liability encourages the airlines and government to
implement training programs designed to prevent liability incurring accidents. In
most contexts the deterrence effect on the company is very relevant. This com-
ment, however, focuses entirely on the fact that, with current technology, wind
shear related aircraft accidents are not entirely avoidable. Thus, no amount of
penalties assessed against a commercial airline or the government will deter acci-
dents because no one can currently prevent these accidents. In this context, the
tort system's liability allocations are justifiable only in the compensation arena.
1-' Arguably, those who do not fly are not beneficiaries and therefore should
not have to share the burden of compensating victims of weather-related aircraft
accidents.
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ages participation. People tend to avoid high liability
fields. Required prelitigation arbitration is a possible an-
swer to this problem. Arbitration is less expensive than
litigation' 54 and creates at least a minimal amount of cer-
tainty; advantages that attenuate constraints on growth.
5. Societal Decision to Limit Liability
Society is capable of limiting liability in order to allow
continued development of science and technology. With-
out this limitation the problem of wind shear will be pro-
longed, and possibly never resolved. Some of the
propositions noted above require society to relinquish its
right to compensation. While this may seem a high price
to pay, the goal is worth the sacrifice because perfected
technology would all but prevent microburst related air
traffic accidents. The opinion expressed is based on the
assumption that society believes these prevention capabil-
ities are of utmost importance. It is difficult to believe
otherwise considering the fact that a large portion of soci-
ety frequently flies. In any event, assuming society is un-
willing to relinquish compensation rights, society, at a
minimum, should be willing to forego certain demands in
the name of progress, and ultimately, safety.
The flying public contributes to the overall problem of
weather related accidents by creating a dilemma for com-
mercial airlines and pilots. The public (particularly the
business traveler), when selecting an air carrier for travel,
places primary importance on departure/arrival timeli-
ness. Since the American economic system is capitalistic,
the competitive efforts by airlines to be timely is good and
necessary. To the extent this effort encourages pilots to
go through, instead of around, potential microbursts, the
system perpetuates the problem. The real question soci-
The high cost of litigation is found, primarily, in excessive awards. For ex-
ample, the parents of a 15-year-old girl who died in the 1985 crash of Delta Flight
191 were awarded $3.4 million in damages in federal court. The court of appeals,
in lowering the amount, ruled that the original award was "excessive, inflated by
emotional evidence [the lower court] had allowed into the trial." Fort Worth Star
Telegram, December 9, 1989.
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ety must confront is whether it is willing, for the sake of
timeliness and profits, to accept a weather-related airline
disaster every three to four years.
CONCLUSION
While science and technology have recently achieved
new heights with the discovery of Doppler radar, wind
shear-related aircraft accidents continue to occur. The
implementation of Doppler radar through NEXRAD will
prevent some accidents but leave many microbursts unde-
tected. While technological devices are visible evidence
of progress, the human element must be emphasized and
supported, for it is the source of such growth. To fully
develop the science of wind shear and in turn perfect its
technology, society must be willing to make sacrifices that
alleviate growth-hampering liability. Such forebearances
are a small price to pay for safer air travel.
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